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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is twofold: first is to
describe the current Marine Corps fire support system as an
overall architecture and the second is to provide teaching
materials for the Joint C3 curriculum. The emphasis will be
to identify and illustrate the various command, control, and
coordination procedures that are evident throughout the
system. The system architecture described will provide a
foundation from which the student will be required to design
their own conceptual architecture. The command and control
architecture of the fire support system is presented. A
detailed analysis of the underlying C2 processes of the
structure is conducted. A case is developed that will
encourage the student towards the application of C2 concepts
and principles. The author concludes with a description of
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The Fire Support Coordination System is a formal
organization used by both the Navy and Marine Corps. Its
primary purpose is to plan, coordinate, and execute fire
plans that lead to the destruction of the enemy. It employs
assets from a variety of supporting arms communities. Given
that the next battlefield can be described as "target rich"
and our expendable resources have limitations, the fire
support system cannot possibly engage all the available
targets on the battlefield. The fire support system must
decide which targets warrant engagement and what is the best
manner with which to attack those targets. The purpose of
this thesis is to describe the current method of fire
support coordination with respect to the command and control
processes contained within. The focus will be on the
application of C3 concepts, emphasizing organizational
structure, process, and formal coordination to the fire
support coordination system. The motivation for the thesis
is to provide a current descriptive command and control
architecture that provides the student an enhanced
capability through which to exercise the concepts introduced
in the Joint C3 curriculum. It is intended to furnish the
p
student with an architectural framework from which they can
design an alternative architecture.
B. DEFINITIONS
The following relate Supporting Arms to the concept of
Command, Control, and Coordination.
1. Supporting Arms Command
This is the authority which a commander in the
military service exercises over supporting arms by virtue of
rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and
responsibility for effectively using available resources and
for planning the employment of organizing, directing,
coordinating, and controlling military forces for the
accomplishment of assigned missions. [Ref. l:p. 2]
2. Suppcrting Arms Control
This is the authority which may be less than full
command exercised by a commander over supporting arms.
[Ref. l:p. 2]
3. Supporting Arms Coordination
This is the planning and executing of air,
artillery, and naval gunfire so that targets are adequately
covered by a suitable weapon or groups of weapons. [Ref. 1:
p. 2]
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter II contains background information on the
organization and personnel involved in the fire support
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coordination process. Readers familiar with current
doctrine regarding fire support coordination may wish to
scan these sections. Chapter III contains the major portion
of the thesis, where the current fire support architecture
is described. The concepts and principles of C2 are then
applied to this fire support architecture in Chapter IV.
Chapter V develops a framework case from which the student
is required to design an alternative architecture. Finally,
Chapter VI introduces some of the terms and methods
associated with the evaluation of a system architecture.
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II. PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
A. ORGANIZATION BACKGROUND
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and define
the various agencies and personnel that comprise the fire
support architecture and system for an amphibious environ-
ment. The first component part to be discussed is the same
one that exists in all military organizations: the
commander.
1. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF)
The individual initially responsible for the overall
coordination of the delivery of supporting arms is the CATF.
His duties and responsibilities mirror those defined in
Chapter I under Supporting Arms Command. He is responsible
for establishing the Supporting Arms Coordination Center
(SACC) and for ensuring the preparation of the plans for the
supporting arms elements. This individual is normally a
Naval Officer holding the rank of Admiral. [Ref. l:p. 1-2]
2. Commander LandinQ Force (CLF)
Prior to the establishrent of supporting arms agen-
cies ashore the person ultimately responsible for the opera-
tion is the CATF. Upon the successful transfer of control
ashore this responsibility is shifted to the CLF. CLF is
normally a Marine General Officer who is also the commander
of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Prior to the
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passage of command and control ashore CLF maintains close
liaison with CATF to ensure the needs of his forces are met.
He maintains an advisor's role with CATF and coordinates
with him closely. [Ref. l:p. 1-3]
3. Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC)
This is CATF's principle agency thruugh which he
exercises overall command and control of supporting arms.
The SACC is responsible for coordinating the delivery of all
supporting fires. The SACC consists of a naval gunfire
section, an air support section, and a target information
center. Figure 1 illustrates the setup of the SACC. [Ref.
2:p. 60-5]
SACC
NGF hir Spt Tgt Info
Section Section LCenter
Figure 1. SACC Organization
The naval gunfire section is responsible for the planning
and coordination of naval gunfire support and normally is
organic to the CATF staff. The air support section
coordinates the planning and exercises responsibility for
all phases of antiair warfare, helicopter coordination, and
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all air support for the amphibious operation. This section
is not normally organic to the CATF staff. It is assigned
from a Tactical Air Control Group Squadron. The Target
Information Center is responsible for the acquisition and
maintenance of target information and target intelligence.
This section is normally organic to the staff. [Ref. 2: p.
60-5]
4. Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC)
An important point is that the SACC is the Navy's
supporting arms coordination agency. A number of the
supporting arms assets used are Marine Corps. The Marine
Corps has its own agency that is responsible for the
coordinaticii of supporting arms. This agency is called the
Fire Support Coordination Center and it reports directly to
the CLF. During the planning stages of the operation the
SACC and FSCC are considered co-equals. During the afloat
phas- of the operation the FSCC and the SACC operate in
close cooperation. Appropriate personnel of the FSCC are
stationed within the SACC to provide for a rapid exchange of
information and to expedite the processing and coordination
of Landing Force fire support requests. [Ref. 1:p.3-2] The
composition of the FSCC includes a fire support coordinator
(FSC), and a number of supporting arms representatives.
These representatives include an artillery representative,
naval gunfire representative, an air representative and
additional personnel to perfcrm operations, develop target
6
operations, develop target information and provide
communication functions. [Ref. l:p. 3-2]
It is important to note that both the SACC and FSCC
are responsible solely for the coordination of fire support
plans and recommendations. They are advisorial and
coordination agencies only and do not command any element.
The responsibility of command remains with CATF and CLF.
Figure 2 is provided to show the control and coordination
relationships [Ref. l:p. 1-4].
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Figure 2. CATF/CLF Control and Coordination Relationships
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5. Tactical Air Command Center (TACC)
Another important member of the fire support
architecture is the Tactical Air Command Center. This is
the senior air control and coordination in the amphibious
operation. It provides for the supervision, coordination,
and general control of all tactical air operations in the
amphibious objective area. [Ref. 2:p. 68-9] The TACC is
not located within the SACC but provides liaison to it. To
conduct efficient air operations the TACC is organized into
five sections.
a. Air Traffic Control Section
The Air Traffic Control Section performs a
similar function to that of a civilian air traffic
controller. Additionally, it is responsible for search and
rescue operations. [Ref. 2:p. 68-11]
b. Air Support Control Section
This section coordinates offensive air support.
Its primary responsibility is to support, advise, and assist
the SACC. Additionally, it processes requests for close air
support. [Ref. 2:p. 68-11]
c. Helicopter Coordination Section
This section's primary responsibility is to
coordinate all helicopter operations conducted in the
amphibious objective area. It also is the primary advisor
to the SACC concerning the employment of helicopters. [Ref.
2:p.68-11]
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d. AntiAir Warfare Section
This section's primary responsibility is to
coordinate the antiair warfare effort. This section is
additionally responsible for coordinating air defense with
the SACC. [Ref. 2:p. 68-11]
e. Plans and Support Section
This section provides the planning,
administrative, and communication support for all of the
TACC sections. [Ref. 2:p. 68-12]
In addition to the sections comprising the TACC
itself, there are also some subordinate agencies that
function under the TACC's control.
f. Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC)
The Tactical Air Direction Center performs
functions and duties similar to that of the TACC but in a
specified area of responsibility. It has the additional
responsibility and capability of assuming the
responsibilities and role of the TACC. This can occur
during advance force operations or in other sectors where
the extreme separation of elements of the force warrants the
establishment of a TADC. [Ref. 2:p. 68-13]
g. Direct Air Support Center (DASC)
The Direct Air Support Center is the principal
air direction and control agency responsible for tactical
air operations directly supporting ground forces. It is
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normally the first air coordination agency ashore during the
amphibious assault. [Ref. 2:p. 68-13]
h. Helicopter Direction Center (HDC)
The Helicopter Direction Center is the air
operations agency under the supervision of the TACC that
controls and directs helicopter operations. The HDC's
primary responsibility is to control the movement of all
helicopters operating within its assigned areas. [Ref. 2:
p. 68-14]
i. Summary
This has been an overview of the air agencies
that support CATF and coordinate with SACC to enable safe
and effective air support operations. Figure 3 is included
to illustrate the layout of the TACC [Ref. 2:p. 68-15].
6. Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)
The last major element of the supporting arms
architecture is the Joint Intelligence Center. This is an
intelligence gathering, processing organization that
combines the intelligence assets of the Navy and the Marine
Corps. This is done in order to facilitate close
coordination between all communities and it enables the
consolidation of intelligence assets and materials. [Ref.
5:p. 2-10] JIC's main purpose is to collect, process, and
disseminate intelligence to the elements of the amphibious
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Figure 3. organization of TACC and TADC
a. Sections Analysis Center
This is the primary section responsible for the
processing of information into intelligence and the
dissemination of that intelligence. It also is responsible
for conducting the intelligence analysis of the situation to
provide input for the operations plan. [Ref. 2:p. 5-4]
This section is further divided into three subsections.
(1) Navy Section. This section is responsible
for all the naval intelligence required for the protection
of the amphibious task force.
(2) Ground Section. This section is
responsible for the analysis of all ground intelligence that
could affect operations ashore.
(3) Air Section. This section is responsible
for the intelligence analysis of all activity dealing with
enemy air assets. [Ref. 2:p. 5-5]
b. Collection and Requirements Section
This section is responsible for the management
and tasking of intelligence collection assets organic to the
amphibious task force. The section is additionally
responsible for requesting collection by external
activities. [Ref. 2:p. 5-5]
c. Imagery Interpretation Section
This section is responsible for interpreting and
analyzing imagery and providing the derived intelligence to
the JIC. [Ref. 2:p. 5-6]
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d. Storage and Retrieval Section
This is the section that basically provides the
data processing capability. This capability will be used to
store and retrieve tactical information in support of the
intelligence analysis effort. (Ref. 2:p. 5-6]
e. Target Information Center
This section is located in the SACC. It
provides intelligence liaison to the SACC. Its main purpose
is to rrovide intelligence data in order to identify likely
targets for attack by the amphibious task force. This
section also is responsible for establishing the target list
for the task force. [Ref. 2:p. 5-6]
f. Administration Section
This section provides the overall clerical
assistance to the JIC. [Ref. 2:p. 5-7]
g. Counter-Intelligence Section
This section directs, processes, and provides
input on all counter-intelligence matters. [Ref. 2:p. 5-7]
h. Naval Special Warfare Intelligence Section
This section prepares the target and mission
folders that will be used during operations conducted by the
special warfare teams. [Ref. 2:p. 5-7]
i. Joint Intelligence Center Electronic Warfare
Analysis and Coordination Center (JICEWACC)
This section is responsible for the planning,
coordination, and management of the signal's intelligence
effort for the task force. [Ref. 2:p. 5-7]
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j. Joint Ship's Exploitation Space
This section provides the communication support
necessary to use cryptologic electronic support measures
(CESM) and special intelligence assets. [Ref. 2:p. 5-8]
k. Joint Electronic Warfare Coordination Center
This section is responsible for the planning and
coordination of electronic warfare assets used by the task
force. [Ref. 2:p. 5-8] Figure 4 depicts the various
personnel and sections that comprise the JIC [Ref. 2:p. 5-
9].
7. Summary
This section has outlined the purpose and
organizational structure of the command, control, and
coordination elements for an amphibious task force. As one
can see there are a number of agencies involved in this
process and they vary in depth and complexity. It is
important to note that the organization of the previous
listed agencies are notional and are only given to provide a
basis for understanding the overall architecture. Many of
the actual structures are task organized to fit a specific
situation but will be similar to the one described.
B. PERSONNEL BACKGROUND
As depicted in the previous section there are a number
of organizations involved within the architecture. This
implies that an extensive amount of coordination must take














This section will describe the functions and duties of some
of the personnel involved in this process. This section
will focus on the personnel involved in the operations of
the SACC and FSCC.
1. Supporting Arms Coordinator/Fire Support Coordinator
(SAC/FSC)
Both the Supporting Arms Coordinator and the Fire
Support Coordinator have similar duties and responsibilities
and will be discussed together. They are responsible for
organizing, training, and supervising the members of their
centers. They both perform duties that center around the
planning and coordination of fire support. Specifically,
their duties include:
- Advising the Commander on all matters pertaining to
fire support.
- Preparing the overall fire support plan developed from
the Commanders' concept of operation.
- Recommends fire support coordination measures.
- Provides clearance on requests for fire support and
deconflicts any problems that may arise.
- Disseminates target information to those requiring the
information.
- Advising the Commander on the selection of targets and
recommends target attack precedence. [Ref. 3:pp. 2-4--
2-7]
2. Naval Gunfire Control Office and Naval Gunfire
Representative
The Naval Gunfire Control Officer is a CATF asset.
The Naval Gunfire Representative comes from the CLF. They
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both perform essentially the same duties. Specifically
their duties are:
- Determining requirements for naval gunfire support
through analysis of the operation plan.
- Preparing and processing requests for naval gunfire
support.
- Performing target analyses.
- Assisting in the coordination and integration of naval
gunfire with other supporting fires.
- Maintaining up to date information regarding the status
of naval gunfire support and its available supply of
ammunition. [Ref. 4:p. 2-6]
3. Artillery Representative
This individual keeps the SAC/FSC appraised of:
- The nuclear, chemical, and conventional capabilities of
supporting artillery.
- The actual artillery support that has been rendered.
- The ammunition availability status.
- His recommendations and information regarding clear-
ances and coordination of artillery missions. [Ref. 1:
p. 3-6]
4. Air Representative
This individual keeps the SAC/FSC appraised of:
- The nuclear, chemical, and conventional capabilities of
air support.
- The actual air support that has been rendered.
- Ordnance and ammunition restrictions and policies which
may affect the availability of air support.
- Recommendations and information of fire support matters
related to air support.
- Probable changes or modifications to planned air
support due to weather, aircraft availability, or
enemy air threat. [Ref. l:p. 3-8]
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These have been some specific duties that the
various supporting arms representatives to the SACC/FSCC are
responsible for. This next list is a summation of duties
that are common to each of them. Common duties:
- Advising the FSC/SAC on capabilities and limitations of
his supporting arm.
- Assists in the preparation of the overall fire support
plan.
- Keeps the TIO advised of all target information
received through his channels.
- Provides input from his own supporting arm to the
FSC/SAC as he develops fire support coordination
measures. [Ref. 3:p. 2-5]
5. TarQet Intelligence Officer
His duties encompass assisting and advising in
matters concerning target acquisition, the collection of
target information, the production of target intelligence,
and the consolidation and dissemination of target
intelligence. Additionally, he is responsible to maintain
close liaison with the target information officer to ensure
a timely and continuous exchange of information and target
intelligence. [Ref. 5:p. 12-4]
6. Target Information Officer (TIO)
The TIO is responsible for the following:
- Keeping the FSC/SAC informed of the status of targets.
- Supervising the operation of the Target Information
Center.
- Advising and assisting the FSC/SAC in the preparation
of the amphibious task force target list.
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- Advises and assists in the selection of ordnance to be
employed against specific targets.
- Maintains close liaison with the Target Intelligence
Officer. [Ref. 5:p. 12-5]
This section has described the various duties and
responsibilities of members of the SACC/FSCC. The Naval and
Marine Corps personnel were often included together because
their respective duties are similar. An important final
note for this chapter is that while the SACC is functioning
the SAC has overall responsibility for its operation while
members from the Landing Force (Marines) provide assistance
and guidance. Figure 5, a functional diagram of the
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III. THE PROCESS ARCHITECTURE
A. BACKGROUND
Command and Control systems architecture has been
described as having a three dimensional approach. According
to JCS publications one and two definition, a C2 system
consists of:
- Physical entities (equipment, software, people and
their associated facilities).
- Structure (organization, concepts of operation)
including procedures and protocols.
- Processes (the functionality of what the system is
doing). (Ref. 6:p. 12]
This definition can be related to the architecture of
the SACC/FSCC. The physical entities associated with the
fire support system would include such items as weapons,
software, personnel, communications equipment, etc. The
structure of the system and its organizational attributes
were described in Chapter II. The emphasis of this chapter
will be on the third element of the C2 system; the
processes. What are the underlying processes that function
throughout the architecture that enable the system to work
effectively? The internal C2 processing functions that
characterize what the system is doing will be discussed
next. The personnel and basic organizational structure that
were described in Chapter II are the skeleton of tne overall
system with the heart being the coordination processes.
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B. PROCESS ARCHITECTURE
Figure 6 is an overall schematic of the process
organization. This figure should be referred to as the
various component parts are discussed. Using a top-down
approach the peak of the structure is the commanding
officer. As in any military organization, this individual
is the one ultimately responsible for everything the unit
does or fails to do. The rest of the architecture is
organized to show that there are four major procedures that
form the basis of the fire support architecture. The four
processes are coordination, weapons, processing, and
sensing.
1. Weapons Unit
This is a generic unit that is used to depict an
organizational headquarters for any one of the supporting
arms units assigned to the fire support process. This
unit's primary purpose is to maintain command and control of
the supporting arm under its direction. This is the element
of the supporting arms architecture that delivers the output
for the system. The output for this unit is some type of
targeted energy upon a target of opportunity.
a. Weapons
This next level down represents the organization
of the weapons themselves. This level depicts the last
organizational command structure in the weapons chain. This
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headquarters or a fire support ship. The specific purpose
is to direct the fires of the resources under its command.
b. Level Three
This level represents the various types of
weapons that are normally associated with the fire support
architecture. As depicted in Figure 6, the various weapon
types include mortars, close air support (fixed wing and
rotary), field artillery, and naval gunfire support assets.
The purpose of this level is to execute the fire command and
deliver force upon a target.
c. Level Four
The final level in the weapons process chain is
included to show that there are a multitude of choices to be
made prior to delivery of a weapon on a target. Within each
weapons family there are a variety of calibers or types of
weapons that can be selected. Additionally, with each
weapons type there is a wide range of ordnance to choose
from each possessing a different capability. For example,
an artillery battalion has the capability of delivering
rounds ranging from 105mm to 155mm and in some cases 203mm.
In conjunction with these various calibers is a wealth of
ordnance options. A short list would include such options
as High Explosive (HE), White Phosphorous (WP), Chemical,
and Nuclear. Additionally, the other family of weapons
(air, naval gunfire, mortars) have an extensive variety of
choices as well.
24
An overall example of what a typical weapons
process would include is:
- Weapons Unit = Artillery Battalion Headquarters.
- Weapons = Artillery Battery.
- Level Three = The Howitzers.
- Level Four = A 155mm, High Explosive Round (HE).
2. ProcessinQ Unit
This is the organizational headquarters for the
second of the four major processes. This unit is
representative of the JIC organizational structure. The
units main purpose is to direct and coordinate the
intelligence assets assigned to the task force. Direction
encompasses the following steps:
- Determination of intelligence requirements.
- Preparation of a collection plan.
- Issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies.
- Supervision and coordination of the processing cycle.
[Ref. 5:p. 4-1]
a. Level Three--Processing
Processing is the task of converting information
into intelligence. It accomplishes this by systematically:
- Recording information.
- Evaluating information to determine its pertinence.
- Analyzing information to isolate significant events.
- Integrating the information.
- Interpreting the information. [Ref. 5:p. 7-1]
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b. Level Four
The process listed above is accomplished through
the course of three subprocesses.
(1) Information Fusion. This is a process
through which elements of information are combined and
blended to form one product of useful intelligence.
(2) Analysis. This subprocess involves the
sifting and sorting of fused information to isolate
significant events related to the mission. [Ref. 5:p. 7-8]
Two component parts of the analysis subprocess are the
integration and interpretation of information. Integration
involves the combination of elements isolated in analysis to
enable the intelligence officer to develop hypotheses about
the enemy force. The purpose of interpretation is to
determine the significance and meaning of the information
and its possible effect on the operation and the
intelligence estimate. [Ref. 5:p. 7-8]
(3) Dissemination. This is the last subprocess
in the overall processing function. After an intelligence
officer has transformed information into usable intelligence
it must now be properly disseminated to the individuals who
need the intelligence. There are three functional elements
of the dissemination subprocess. The first is the
Requirements Function. This function ensures that the
dissemination of the intelligence is timely, pertinent, and
secure. [Ref. 5:p. 8-1] Timely means it gets to a user in
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an expeditious enough manner that it is useful. Pertinent
means that it is disseminated only to those who really need
that particular item of intelligence. This function must be
secure enough that the enemy does not realize that friendly
forces have gained this knowledge and subsequently alters
his plans, negating the friendly forces entire effort.
The second is the Means Function. The
dissemination process needs to be aware of the various means
of dissemination available (oral, written, contact) and
select the appropriate means.
The third is the Documents Function. This
entire process must be documented to establish a base from
which current operations can be positively influenced and
from which future operations can draw information from.
3. Sensor Unit
This is the organizational headquarters for the
third major process that is depicted in Figure 6. Its
primary purpose is to direct the collection of intelligence
effort. This unit will coordinate a large and diverse array
of assets. Many of the assets utilized will not be organic
to the task force and will require much coordination and
liaison. This unit is configured to systematically sense
for information pertinent to a given intelligence problem.
The data acquired from the sensing effort results in the
identification of enemy targets and activities that might
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otherwise have gone undetected. The sensing effort is
comprised of two key elements.
a. Level Three--Sensing
This level depicts the actual process of
sensing. The sensing effort should be carefully planned and
most importantly it should be specific to the needs of the
operational mission. The sensing process needs to consider
the enemy situation and must carefully analyze weather and
terrain factors that can affect its performance.
b. Level Four
(1) Reconnaissance. The definition of
reconnaissance is,
A mission undertaken, to obtain by visual observation or
other detection methods, information about the activities
and resources of an enemy or potential; or to secure data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic
characteristics of a particular area. [Ref. 7:p. 286J
Reconnaissance is a directed, sensing effort with a goal to
obtain specific information about a given subject. An
example of a reconnaissance effort would be an infantry
patrol sent out to obtain information about the strength of
an enemy unit.
(2) Surveillance. The definition of
surveillance is, "The systematic observation of aerospace,
surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by
visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means."
[Ref. 7:p. 335) Surveillance encompasses all techniques of
accomplishing a continuous (i.e., all weather, day or night)
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systematic watch over the objective area and enemy
activities to provide timely information for the
intelligence effort. [Ref. 5:p. 10-1] Surveillance is
different from reconnaissance because it is not given a
specific time constrained mission. Surveillance is involved
with the continuous observation of an area or entity to
monitor it for any significant changes in its posture. [Ref.
5:p. 10-2]
(3) Functional Elements--Surface and Airspace.
Reconnaissance and surveillance of surface areas is a
collection effort directed to obtain information about a
locality, area, enemy unit, or any specified area of
terrain. This involves the use of ground, amphibious,
aerial, and communications-electronics collection agencies.
These agencies employ a variety of sensors, ranging from the
human eye and ear to a variety of sophisticated electronic
devices. [Ref. 5:p. 10-2]
Reconnaissance and surveillance of airspace
is the action taken to obtain weather data in areas where
weather reports are not available. It is also the
systematic patrolling and observation of airspace. It uses
electronic, visual, or other sensors primarily for the
purpose of identifying and determining the movements of
aircraft or missiles through the airspace. [Ref. 5:p. 10-2]
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4. Coordination Unit
This is the section analogous to the SACC/FSCC. Its
primary mission is to coordinate the efforts and assets of
the other three processes (weapons, processing, sensor) and
deliver its resources at the enemy to effectively accomplish
its mission. Because the fire support available to the task
force is a limited asset it must be used wisely and this is
the units ultimate goal. The Coordination Unit receives
Information and intelligence from the other three processes
in order to perform its most important function:
Weaponeering.
a. Level Three--Weaponeering
This is the process that does an analysis of the
target to determine which weapons will be effective against
the target and the degree of damage it is possible to
achieve with various types and quantities of ammunition.
The weaponeer needs to decide what level of engagement
(destruction, neutralization, suppression) will render the
target ineffective. The Joint Munitions Effectiveness
Manuals (JMEM) are the primary source for determining
probable effects of weapons against various targets. [Ref.
3:p. 7-21]
b. Level Four
(1) TargetinQ/Tactical Analysis. This is the
process that occurs after the weaponeering process has
decided what level of fire support will be used to engage a
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target and render it ineffective. This subprocess analyzes
the target to determine its tactical significance. This
means it should be weighed against the task force mission
and objectives to see if this target can have a detrimental
impact. The process must also carefully consider the
tradeoffs involved in engaging the target, i.e., other
potential targets that may not be attacked if this target is
attacked. The last check in this process is to evaluate
whether this target fits the parameters given in the Rules
of Engagement (ROE). [Ref. 3:p. 7-22]
(2) Weapon Selection. The final subprocess is
the actual weapon selection. Upon completion of this entire
process, the appropriate weapon and level of fire support is
determined. This decision is then transmitted to the
Weapons Unit for execution.
C. FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING PROCESS
The following pages, through the use of a flow chart,
illustrate the fire support planning process. These flow
charts come from the Marine Corps doctrinal publication
pertaining to fire support coordination [Ref. l:pp.H-2--H-
12]. The flow chart depicts the entire planning process
from the initial concept of operation to the final
development of a target list. They also point out the
numerous decisions and processes that occur throughout the
system. The chart is included so that a better
understanding of the flow of information will develop.
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The following is a synopsis of what is transpiring on
each page of the flow charts. (On pages 33-43 below, the
page reference from Reference 1 is indicated at the bottom
of the page.) On page H-2 the planning cycle begins with
the formulation of a concept of operation based on
commanders guidance. Pages H-2 to H-12 represent the fire
support planning process for a Marine Corps Division. It
delineates the planning cycle for each organizational level
of fire support coordination. Pages H-2 to H-5 represent
the Division level. Pages H-6 to H-9 represent the
Regimental level. Pages H-10 to H-12 represent the
Battalion level of fire support planning. Each of these
distinct steps perform similar steps in the planning cycle.
The beginning of each loop (H-2, H-6, H-10) is where a
determination of fire support requirements is developed
concurrently with battle plans. Target lists and plans are
consolidated and disseminated to subordinate units. The
next step in each loop is the preliminary weaponeering stage
(H-3, H-7, H-11). At this point the target is analyzed, the
best supporting arm available is selected, and then the
target is assigned to a target list and promulgated to the
necessary units. The final stage in the planning cycles (H-
5, H-9, H-12) is the consolidation phase. This step
consolidates the requirements for fire support from higher,
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targets that is disseminated up the chain of command along
with any additional requests for fire support.
D. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROCESS
The previous section demonstrated the fire support
planning process, this section will demonstrate the fire
support coordination process. This series of flow charts is
provided by Marine Corps doctrinal publications. [Ref.l:
pp. I-3--I-13] Included in the flow charts are the initial
target attack analysis, target coordination and safety
checks, and the mission processes for coordination of the
three types of supporting arms available: close air
support, naval gunfire, and field artillery. This section
gives a more detailed description of the diverse
coordination activities taking place within the firp support
system. This section is intended to give an appreciation
for the complexity of the process confronting the SAC/FSC.
The following is a synopsis of the events occurring in
the fire support coordination process. While the previous
section described the formal fire planning prorcess, this
section deals more with the "on call" or unscheduled fire
missions and how they are processed. (On pages 45-56 below,
the page reference from Reference 1 is indicated at the
bottom of the page.) Page 1-3 begins the process with an
infantry company acquiring a target. The company decides
whether it can handle the mission alone (A) or whether
further coordination is required (1-4.1,2,3). Page 1-4
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continues with the mission processing ard coordination.
This results in either a canceled mission or a transmitted
fire support request to supporting arms agency (1-7,1-10,1-
11). Pages 1-5 to 1-6 are where the target coordination and
safety checks are accomplished. The FSCC/SACC are
monitoring all missions. This procedure is performed on
every mission and provides for troop safety. This procedure
results in the mission either being cleared safe or stopped.
Pages 1-7 to 1-9 depict the close air support mission
process. This shows the steps the aviation community goes
through in order to conduct an airstrike. Page 1-10 shows
the process the naval gunfire community goes through in
directing a mission. Pages I-l to 1-13 illustrate the
process that the field artillery units go through before
they fire upon a target.
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IV. COORDINATION PRINCIPLES APPLICATION
A. BACKGROUND
The entire structure described in Chapters I and II
cannot operate efficiently without a coordinated effort.
How is this achieved and who does the coordinating? This is
the scope of what Chapter IV will present. Before beginning
to describe who is involved in the coordination process, one
must first be knowledgeable about coordinating mechanisms
and their existence in the system. Henry Mintzberg, defines
six basic coordinating mechanisms that describe the
fundamental ways in which organizations coordinate their
work. Some of these are informal methods of coordination
while the others involve some type of standardization to
ensure that the work is coordinated.
B. COORDINATION MECHANISMS
1. Mutual Adjustment
This is an informal method of coordination. This
method achieves coordination through the simple process of
informal communication. The people who do the work interact
with each other to ensure coordination occurs. Mutual
adjustment is prevalent in the simplest and the most complex
of organizations. In simplistic organizations it is used
because it is an obvious way to communicate. In complex
organizations it is used because often it is the only
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reliable means of accomplishing coordination under adverse
conditions. This method is analogous to two men in a canoe
coordinating their effort through simple communication.
[Ref. 8:p. 279] It should be noted that mutual adjustment
can be formal in large complex organizations. An example of
this would be a task force.
2. Direct Supervision
This is a mechanism of coordination that involves
one person giving orders to others. This usually arises out
of a situation where a number of individuals must work
together and mutual adjustment is not considered an
effective mechanism of coordination. This is the situation
where a leader or commander is required to initiate the
coordination. This method would be analogous to a larger,
eight man canoe where simple communication would not
accomplish the coordination necessary to propel the boat
swiftly. A coxswain would be added to directly supervise
and coordinate the action of the men. [Ref. 8:p. 279]
3. Standardization of Work Processes
This is a mechanism that ensures coordination
through the detailed specification of the work processes.
The work of different people in the organization is
programmed to facilitate coordination. In a military
organization this is similar to having a detailed Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) that is strictly adhered to. Some
examples of this are the procedures followed in the
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assembly/disassembly of a rifle or some specific maintenance
procedure. [Ref. 8:p. 279]
4. Standardization of Outputs
This mechanism of coordination specifies what the
output or results of a process are supposed to represent.
In this manner the interfaces between individuals is
predetermined. Each successive link in the process knows
what the output of the other links will be and this achieves
coordination. [Ref. 8:p. 279] An example of this type of
output is shown in Figure 7. This is a form used for
target analyses which ensures a logical and orderly
examination of all factors to determine the most effective
means of attacking a target. This form is extractd from
Marine Corps doctrinal publications. [Ref. 5:pp. AD-I--AD-
2]
5. Standardization of Skills
This is the mechanism of coordination where the
worker is standardized not the output or the work process.
This can be considered a looser way to achieve coordination.
The workers skills or knowledge are often standardized
external to the organization in which they work. This
standardization would typically be accomplished in a
military service training school. The individual is taught
a body of knowledge and a set of skills which are
subsequently applied to the work. Coordination is then
achieved by virtue of various operators having learned what
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TARGET ANALYSIS
1. SITUATION AND COUkSE OF ACTION
a. Situation of Opposing Forces
(1) Enemy Situation. Include information that will aid in target analysis.
(2) Friendly Situation. Include information that will aid in attacking the target.
b. Target Characteristics
(1) Target Description. Include type (personnel, materiel, terrain featitres), number of personnel, quantity of materiel,
and activity.
(2) Vunerability. Include type and amount of cover, type of materiel, type of construction, mobility, and density of
personnel and materiel.
(3) Physical Location and Altitude. Include grid reference and altitude of target, location with respect to supported
unit and terrain features, and proximity to friendly troops.
(4) Accuracy of Location. Give estimated accuracy of target location.
(5) Size and Shape of Target Area. Give the dimensions and shape of the target area and distribution of personnel and
materiel within the area.
(6) Terrain and Weather. Include brief analysis of weather and terrain in the target area; include any terrain features
affecting the means and methods of attack.
c. Target Capabilities. Discuss the capabilities of the target as they affect the accomplishment of the mission of the
supported unit; if a terrain feature(s), show how it affects enemy capabilities.
d. Other Factors. List and discuss any or all of the following factors and any additional ones that will affect the choice of
firepower, delivery means, and method of attack:
(I) Urgency of Attack. Usually determined by the type of target (static or fleeting) and its capabilities.
(2) Enemy Countermeasures. State ability of the enemy to minimize the effects of firepower; consider capabilities of the
enemy to prevent effective delivery and to bring countermeasures against delivery means after attack.
Figure 7. Example of Standardized Output (Target Analysis)
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(3) Enemy Discipline and Morale. State factors which will aid in determining the amount of firepower required to
neutralize personnel targets.
(4) Creation of Obstacles. Discuss any considerations concerning desirability or undesirability of creating obstacles by
attacking the target.
(5) Civilian Casualtie. Show approximate number of civilians in the target area and the estimated effect of causing
excessive casualties.
(6) Surprise. Discuss any particular methods desired to obtain surprise, including least expected time of attack, means of
delivery, and restrictions on registration.
e. Means of Attack. Note all available types of firepower and required amounts with which it would be practical to attack
the target; show most practicable delivery means in each case.
2. ANALYSIS OF MEANS OF ATTACK
Discuss the effect of each meant of attack on the target characteristics (par. 1b), target capabilities (par. 1c), and other factors
(par. Id). For each means of atta!k, include:
a. Location of center of impact which will obtain greatest effect; include optimum height of borst for nuclear weapons.
b. Effect of available supply rate.
c. Estimate of enemy casualties and materiel damage.
d. Estimate of civilian casualties.
e. Estimate of obstacles created.
f. Precautions required for friendly troops.
Note: The analysis of each means of attack may be shown in an annex.
3. COMPARISON OF MEANS OF ATTACK
Summarize the outstanding advantages and disadvantages of each means of attack and determine which offers the greatest
promise of success.
4. DECISION OR RECOMMENDATION
a. Type and amount of firepower and delivery means.
b. Unit(s) to fire.
c. Grid reference and altitude of desired center of impact; height of burst when applicable.
d. Time of attack.
e. Safety precautions, special coordination, and warnings required.
f. Method for determining poststrike analysis.
Figure 7. (Continued)
61
to expect of each other. They do not necessarily need to
communicate to achieve coordination they just know how each
other will perform. [Ref. 8:p. 280]
6. Standardization of Norms
This method of coordination is a result of the
individuals in an organization sharing a common set of
beliefs. For example, all the individuals in the fire
support system share the same belief of supporting the
maneuver element and rendering its fire support assets upon
the enemy. Coordination is achieved because they all know
they must work together to achieve this shared goal. [Ref.
8:p. 280]
These six coordinating mechanisms will be used to
highlight how the fire support process reaches coordination.
As Henry Mintzberg states, "These coordinating mechanisms
are the basic means that link together the divided labor of
the organization. They serve as the most basic elements of
structure--the glue that holds the organization together."
[Ref. 8:p. 280]
C. LIAISON DEVICES
Mutual adjustment may often occur naturally in small
work units but to ensure that mutual adjustment occurs, a
formal structure is required. These formal structures are
called liaison devices and their purpose is to stimulate the
occurrence of mutual adjustment between units. There are
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four types of liaison devices with the intended purpose of
facilitating coordination.
1. Liaison Positions
These are job positions created to coordinate the
work of a number of units directly. This position is not
necessarily a formal one. It is, however, given enough
latitude to influence the situation so that coordination is
reached. They are given the capability to coordinate
without passing through any additional vertical or
managerial channels. They normally do not carry much formal
authority over the units they coordinate with and must rely
upon their powers of persuasion and negotiation to foster
coordination between two units. [Ref. 8:p. 287]
2. Task Forces and StandinQ Committees
These are institutionalized forms of meetings which
bring together members of different units. Task forces are
an effective horizontal linkage device for dealing with
temporary issues. The task force brings together
experts/representatives from various fields to deal with
some temporary issue and come up with a recommended course
of action. After this phase was accomplished, a standing
committee would be formed to implement and oversee the
proposed strategy. Task forces are temporary devices while




These are essentially liaison positions but with
formal authority over some aspects of the units they
coordinate between. An example would be control of
resources. This device is stronger than the previous two
because the integrating manager does not have to rely as
much on his powers of negotiation and persuasion to get
things accomplished. The integrating manager is given
enough formal authority over the units that he can
facilitate coordination. [Ref. 8:p. 280]
4. Matrix Structure
This device is often used when the environment that
the organization operates within is complex and uncertain.
There is often environmental pressure placed upon two or
more critical outputs (i.e., plans and coordination). This
double pressure usually results in a dual authority
structure being formed. The vertical and horizontal lines
of authority must be given equal recognition. A dual
authority structure is thereby created so the balance of
power between them is equal. A drawback to the matrix
structure is that people often end up reporting to two
bosses which can reduce the ability to have unity of effort.
[Ref. 8:p. 280]
D. APPLICATION TO FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM
Now that the various coordination mechanisms and liaison
devices used in organizations have been introduced, the task
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is to apply them to the fire support architecture. The fire
support architecture that was described back in Figure 6
shows that there are numerous vertical and horizontal links.
Coordination is most often needed in organizations that are
horizontally specialized, since specialization impedes
natural coordination. Specifically, each of the processes
(Weapons, Sensing, Processing, Weaponeering) are primarily
concerned with the execution of their duties and
accomplishment of their mission. They are not necessarily
concerned with the status of the other processes. This
justifies the need for a more formal structure of
coordination to ensure the flow of information. The
functional grouping of the processes depicted in Figure 6
illustrates that there is much horizontal specialization.
Additionally, coordination is needed in organizations that
are complex and where there is much interdependence among
the units. The fire support system certainly fits both
these criteria. [Ref. 8:p. 289]
1. Vertical Links
Throughout the various levels of the architecture
there are a number of vertical links. These vertical links
depict the existence of direct supervision. This is the
situation where the leader is required to initiate the
coordination. The leader has formal authority over those he
is linked to and exercises his power to ensure that the
vertical information flow and coordination are transpiring.
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The vertical control and coordination is extensive
throughout the architecture and requires little explanation
since it is prevalent throughout most organizations in our
society. It is relatively simple to understand that if your
boss initiates the coordination you will coordinate. The
difficult coordination concepts to comprehend are the ones
dealing with the horizontal links.
2. Horizontal Links
Levels three and four are where the predominance of
the various horizontal links occur and will serve to
highlight the coordination mechanisms and liaison devices
that operate throughout.
a. Level Three
Figure 8 depicts the interunit links among the
four major processes of the architecture. For clarifica-
tion, visualize that there is a big box surrounding this
figure that represents the SACC/FSCC acting as the unit
bringing this all together. As shown in the diagram there
are various inputs and outputs among the processes
confirming the existence of interdependence. The beginning
of the fire support cycle is the sensing process. The
inputs tc sensing are environmental factors (weather and
topography) and a mission tasking that delineates what it is
supposed to sense. The sensing function is systematic and
once an assignment has been directed the area is sensed and
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the analysis function. The analysis function takes
additional input from the friendly maneuver units to
integrate with the data it received from the sensing
function. It does this to ensure that it has a complete
picture of the situation so that the analysis and subsequent
recommendations are accurate. The output of the analysis
function is fused target information that is germane to the
data required by the weaponeering function. In addition to
the target information, the weaponeering function also must
take into consideration the Commander's guidance and the
Rules of Engagement (ROE) that are relevant to the
operation. Commander's guidance would include such items
as:
- Which are the priority targets.
- What are the desired effects against specific types/
classes of targets.
- What is the scheme of maneuver.
- Any safety restraints to be placed upon supporting
arms
- What are his future intentions.
Rules of Engagement are permissive or restrictive measures
that give guidance concerning the extent of action that may
be taken against an enemy. The eventual output of the
weaponeering function is a specific weapon assignment that
is conveyed to the appropriate weapons unit. The output of
the weapons function is some type of targeted energy that is
focused towards the enemy. Keep in mind that this entire
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process is not as elementary as the diagram may depict.
There is much more interaction transpiring between the
various elements in the cycle (i.e., reports, updates, and
countless other communications). The limited inputs/outputs
shown, illustrate the major purpose of each step in the
cycle.
Coordination at this level is mainly
accomplished through standardization. It is effected
through Standardization of Work Processes and Outputs. In
actuality, coordination at this level is attained
automatically by virtue of standards that predetermine what
each process will do. [Ref. 8:p. 279] Each of the
processes have evolved their procedures to the point where
they have developed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).
These SOP's guide them in the performance of their functions
and delineate what form their output will be in, who it
should go to, and how it should be disseminated. A
disadvantage to the standardization of this level is the
amount of variety that can enter the system. The work
processes and outputs can be standardized but you cannot
control what the enemy does or even on occasions what your
own forces do. This means that no matter how much you




Figure 9 represents the major functions that are
being executed and the interunit links that occur between
them. At each stage in the cycle the primary input and
output are depicted. This level represents the detailed
functions that cause the fire support system to operate
efficiently. As discussed in level three, level four also
has interdependence among its assorted functions. The
beginning of the level four cycle is the Reconnaissance and
Surveillance function. The outcome of this function is the
infusion of raw data that will be used to develop the
targeting solution. The next step in the cycle is the
Information Fusion function. Here, the raw data received is
blended and combined to form a useful target information
product. Based on some set models the output of this
function is Indications and Warnings. These indications and
warnings may be evidence concerning specific aspects of the
area of operations or evidence concerning potential enemy
actions [Ref. 5:p. 12-1]. The next step is the analysis
phase. Here, the evidence received as input is analyzed
with the goal of producing target intelligence. The target
intelligence portrays and locates the components of a target
or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and
relative importance [Ref. 5:p. 12-1). Once the target
intelligence is formulated it next goes through a








matched to the organizational framework and distributed to
the appropriate agency for action. The target information
identified for the fire support system is next routed to the
targeting selection function. This step is where the
decision on whether or not the target should be attacked is
determined. The result of this function is a target
designation number that is used to classify the target.
From this point the cycle progresses into the weapons
selection phase. This is the stage where the target is
matched against the available weapons systems and the
optimum weapon is selected to engage the target. Once a
weapon system has been assigned that specific weapon
community (mortars, air, naval gunfire, artillery) carry out
their assigned tasks and attack the target.
Coordination at this level follows along lines
similar to level three. Once again much of the coordination
is accomplished through standardization. The
interdependence among the stages in the level four cycle
requires that much of the work processes be standardized.
The standard work processes allow the personnel to perform
productively and develops a standard output format that can
they be passed on to the next stage. Each link in the cycle
knows what the format of the output from the previous link
will be in. Realize though, that there is going to be
variety to the content of the output. The goal of the
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standardization at this level is to handle the incoming
variety, and information through a coordinated effort.
c. Coordination Unit Level
This is the level where the entire system comes
together. This is the level that must coordinate the
operations of all the other levels. This unit is
representative of a SACC/FSCC. As described in Chapter II,
there are numerous representatives from the supporting arms
and intelligence communities assigned to the SACC/FSCC. The
majority of the personnel assigned to the SACC/FSCC have
limited authority over the agencies they represent. They
are sent to the unit in a liaison position to bridge the gap
between their agency and the SACC/FSCC. Their main purpose
is to facilitate coordination. The SAC/FSC themselves are
integrating managers. They are essentially liaison
personnel with some formal authority over those with whom
they coordinate. [Ref. 8:p. 288] They do not have direct
authority over the units they link with but they do have
responsibility for some of their outputs (i.e., plans and
coordination of supporting fires). The SAC/FSC, acting as
an integrating manager, must use mutual adjustment and his
powers of persuasion to effect coordination. Remember from
Chapter I that the SAC is responsible to the CATF for
coordinating the delivery of all supporting fires. To
accomplish this he must integrate and coordinate the efforts
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of the liaison officers and in doing so uses the stronger
coordination mechanism of mutual adjustment.
d. Additional Coordination Assistance
There are two other mechanisms of coordination
that are pervasive throughout the system and facilitate the
coordination. These are the Standardization of Norms and
the Standardization of Skills. Since this system is a
military organization both these mechanisms contribute to
coordination.
Standardization of skills is achieved through
professional military schools. For example, the
intelligence analyst is trained at a military intelligence
school. The military specialty designation that classifies
him denotes the special skills he has. This coordination
mechanism is prevalent throughout the system since all
military personnel are trained at some type of occupational
school. This mechanism attains coordination because
individuals know what to expect of each other.
Another coordination mechanism that permeates
the entire structure is the Standardization of Norms. The
implementation of this coordination mechanism is similar to
that of the Standardization of Skills. However, this
mechanism is not a specific skill training but rather
overall military training. This indoctrination training is
accomplished during the initial training cycle (Bootcamp).
This is where the individual is introduced to the common
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beliefs and principles of the organization. Even across
different service boundaries there are similar norms. Since
each member of the fire support system is a trained military
person one would expect that they share common beliefs.
This mechanism fosters coordination because each member





The previous chapters have provided a description of the
fire support coordination process. They have defined
personnel positions and duties, shown the underlying
processes involved in the architecture, and they have
identified the numerous horizontal and vertical coordination
links contained in the architecture. These links have been
further analyzed to show the coordination mechanisms and
liaison devices that are prevalent in the system.
The SACC/FSCC face a formidable challenge in the complex
environment of the modern day battlefield. Within the last
ten years the Marine Corps has gone through several
substantial organizational changes. Some of these have
affected the fire support system. One of these is the major
restructuring of the artillery regiments. They have changed
their organizational structure primarily due to the
introduction of the new 155mm weapon system. Additionally,
infantry battalions have been restructured three times to
optimize warfighting capabilities. Recently, the concept of
an amphibious task force attacking from "over the horizon"
has become an adopted tactic which is undergoing testing.
This concept has introduced many new systems and problems
for the fire support structure to deal with. Further, in
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today's marketplace, there are decision aids and expert
systems available that could improve the capabilities of the
system. However, with all these changes occurring, the
system of integrating and coordinating fires has remained
unchanged since World War II and the Korean War. The status
quo has characterized fire support coordination.
Technological advances in recent years have created a more
powerful fire support capability. Today's battlefields are
becoming more and more complex because of the influx of
advanced electronic systems. The number of sensors that
provide more timely and accurate information is increasing.
Also enemy ferces are becoming more sophisticated. This
improved electronic technology combined with a more
sophisticated enemy has increased the amount of information
available to the SACC/FSCC. [Ref. 12:p. 34]
B. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Given the technological advancements in military systems
and the increased complexity of the modern battlefield, the
next generation of fire support coordination is needed. The
previous chapters have described the organization, concepts,
and processes comprising the current fire support
coordination system. Your task now is to design an
alterndtive method of organizing and staffing the fire
support structures to optimize fire support coordination and
integration.
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Develop a scenario that incorporates some change to the
environment surrounding the fire support system. Some
examples would be to build a scenario around the
introduction of an expert system or decision aid.
Another example would be to alter the threat to a point
where the current architecture needs adjustment.
Using this scenario as a point of departure design an
alternative architecture for the fire support process
that is capable of coordination and integration given a
technological change or a changing threat.
Identify the formal coordination mechanisms or liaison
devices required at each location in the fire support
structure and processes.
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VI. MEASUREMENT OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND
Now that a different architecture has been developed,
the final question is how to determine which architecture is
better. This is the most important and probably the
toughest question to answer. How is it possible to measure
the effectiveness or efficiency of the architecture? Is it
a quantitative or a qualitative measure? To begin with
let's start with a simpler breakdown of the duties and
responsibilities of the fire support system. This will then
allow the development of measures that evaluate the merit of
the architecture. All of the traditional stated duties
involving coordination can be boiled down to three simply
stated axioms:
- To ensure friendly fires do not harm friendly personnel
or equipment.
- To ensure maximum efficiency in the use of supporting
arms.
- To accomplish the above goals without unnecessarily
hindering or delaying the destruction of the enemy.
[Ref. 14:p. 3-1]
These are obviously not the only important responsibilities
but the evaluation must begin somewhere, and these three
axioms represent the major processes. Keeping these three
axioms in mind, the next step is to formulate some measures
that will investigate the performance of the architecture.
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B. MOP, MOE, MOFE
A method often used in the field is the initiation of
measures that assess the performance, function, and
effectiveness of a system. The following are definitions of
these measures.
1. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
A quantitative expression of the extent to which a
combat system or a weapon performs its mission assignment
under a specified set of conditions. MOE's are the criteria
that are common to the evaluation of all competing
alternative systems and are used to evaluate each system in
terms of objective attainment. It is a measure of how well
the command and control system performs its functions within
an operational environment. MOE's measure the integration
of all command and control functions of the process. Some
examples of the types of things MOE's focus on: sensor
detections, number of targets identified, number of targets
engaged. (Ref. 15:p. 5-19]
TASK: Develop at least one MOE for an architecture
2. Measures of Performance (MOP)
A quantitative expression of how a combat system or
weapon functions under a specified set of conditions. They
are used to measure how well a particular function of a
command and control process is executed. Due to the
interaction between system performance and combat events,
MOP's and MOE's are interrelated. While MOE's relate to the
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overall combat results achieved, the MOP's relate to the
manner in which the individual sub-systems and elements
contribute to those results. Some examples of MOP's are:
reliability, survivability, cost, error rates, signal-to-
noise ratio, detection range, and location accuracy. [Ref.
15:p. 2-6]
TASK: Develop an MOP for an architecture.
3. Measures of Force Effectiveness (MOFE)
A measure of how a command and control system and
the force (sensors, weapons, command and control structure)
of which it is a part, performs its mission and contributes
to the battle outcome. MOFE's relate the command and
control system to the force, including weapons capability.
[Ref. 15:p. 2-6]
TASK: Develop an MOFE for an architecture.
MOE's are measured relative to some standard. This
means there is some known standard of how a perfect system
would function. This then allows for a comparison between
the designed architecture and a perfect situation.
Theoretically, given a perfect command and control system,
we would expect to identify every hostile target, make the
correct decisions for attack, and destroy each target.
[Ref. 15:p. 2-6]
A distinction should be made between the terms MOE
and MOFE. The reason is that other factors contribute to
whether an improvement in a system MOE results in
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improvements in an MOFE. For example, increasing target
detections (MOE), will not have much effect when no further
ammunition is available to the weapons. Relating MOE's to
MOFE's and consequently being able to evaluate a command and
control system is a very complex issue. It should be noted
that MOE's themselves, as well as MOFE's, are related to the
operational context of the mission and to assumed enemy
actions. This means they are both inherently scenario
dependent. [Ref. 15:p. 2-7] MOE's and MOFE's are based
heavily on judgmental decisions. Even when they have
quantitative results there are judgmental decisions made
that can greatly influence the results. [Ref. 15:p. 2-7]
For example, the number of targets identified is a
quantitative measure. This measure can be heavily
influenced by decisions concerning boundary of the area
sensed, sensitivity and time constraints, or mode of
operation.
MOP's, in most cases, are quantitative measures and
are related to the hard sciences (engineering) and can be
measured or estimated. On occasions they can be subjective
and qualitative. An example of this would be an ordinal
ranking by a panel of experts. [Ref. 15:p. 2-7]
C. MEASURE DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION
The following are some examples of the factors to look
at in regards to the development of MOE's and MOFE's. One
of the first items to be considered is the environment in
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which the system operates. The fire support coordination
system is typically called upon to operate in a variety of
environments. These range from amphibious to ground,
nighttime to daytime, and limited war to large-scale
warfare. One item to assess is how well does the system
perform in each of these environments. Since the fire
support system must function in a number of different
environments, a better measure might be its ability to
gracefully transition from one environment to another with a
minimum loss of continuity or degradation in effectiveness.
(Ref. 16:p. 9]
Another possible measure is to monitor Lhe cycle time of
components of the system. This means the elapsed between
events is measured in order to determine responsiveness. An
example of this would be to measure the cycle time between
the sensor detection of a target and the physical attack of
the attack. [Ref.16:p. 9] The cycle times performance
could also be measured in different environments.
Once the measure is developed the next step is to
evaluate it. One of the best ways to evaluate the types of
measures involved in the fire support system will be
through the conduct of a field experiment. These can entail
actual field exercises or command post exercises (CPX). A
possible outcome of these methods is the development of a
simulation (computer model) that represents the processes of
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the fire support system. Field experiments can be defined
as combat simulations with the following characteristics:
- Actual physical representation of opposing forces with
conflicting combat objectives.
- A setting in the actual or analogous environment.
- The inclusion of trained military personnel.
- The use of actual or surrogate equipment.
- The involvement of a control mechanism (umpires) to
enforce the rules, and a data collection mechanism
(instrumentation). A computer may be an integral part
of this control mechanism. [Ref. 17:p. 269]
Field experiments serve two purposes; they produce data
about the system and they provide operational training for
the unit. A field experiment is useful to the trainer in
developing new and better training methods and in measuring
their effectiveness. It can be used to evaluate and compare
the relative effectiveness of two or more ways of organizing
a combat unit. [Ref. 17:p. 271] This fits the requirement
for measuring the advantages of an alternative fire support
architecture.
The field experiment is not a panacea for evaluating a
command and control system. The most obvious disadvantage
is the cost of conducting a field experiment. Conducting
any exercise that involves the use of large numbers of
personnel and equipment results in excessive cost. Another
limitation is the extent of realism that is portrayed by the
opposing force. Are they really representative of an enemy
or do they just mirror our tactics? [Ref. 17:p. 276]
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D. EFFECTIVENESS VERSUS EFFICIENCY
The final significance from the analysis of an
alternative architecture is whether or not there is a gain
in organizational effectiveness or efficiency.
Effectiveness and efficiency are related to the units goals.
The goals of an organization are the formally defined
outcomes that an organization states it is trying to achieve
[Ref. 9:p. 289]. These are analogous to the three mission
statements of the fire support system stated at the
beginning of the chapter. Organizational effectiveness is
defined as the degree to which an organization realizes its
goals. Effectiveness evaluates the extent to which multiple
goals are attained. [Ref. 9:p. 98] The term effectiveness
is used to refer to the organizations ability to maximize
outputs by whatever means, including the technical
efficiency of its processes and its management of input and
output environments. Measures of effectiveness were
discussed earlier and are a criterion used to determine
effectiveness. An effective process is one that produces
outputs that best meet the needs of the combat organization.
[Ref. 18]
The term efficiency is different from effectiveness.
Efficiency refers to the costs incurred in goal attainment.
Efficiency can be measured on the average by the ratio of
the units produced to the costs required to produce those
units. An example would be the amount of ammunition used to
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destroy a target divided by the costs (time, money,
manpower). An efficient use of resources is one that
produces the most output for the specified level of resource
usage, given a physical and organizational technology. An
organization is either efficient or it is not. [Ref. 18]
The major difference between effectiveness and
efficiency is that effectiveness relates to goal attainment
while efficiency refers to the costs incurred to obtain
those goals. In general an effective output is efficient,
but not all efficient outputs are effective.
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VII. SUMMARY
Undoubtedly, comprehension of C2 system architecture
theory is an important issue to be addressed in today's
military structure. It is important to understand the
principles and concepts involved in systems architecture.
Additionally, it must be possible to discern the C2
processes that operate within the architecture. The
contents of this thesis as regards to definitions,
processes, architecture description, case formulation, and
evaluation should serve as a common point of departure
towards the discernment and analysis of a system
architecture. Comprehension of system architecture theory
is vitally significant if innovative designs of new systems
or the redesign of existing systems is expected. The system
architecture must be continually assessed to ensure that it
maintains pace with the ever increasing upgrades in
technology. As constraints on the defense dollar become
tighter and tighter the need for increased effectiveness
from our systems is critical. A major step towards
attaining this is to have a complete understanding of system
architecture theory. Further research is needed in areas
dealing with the design of specific system architectures and
with models that evaluate their relative effectiveness and
efficiency. A technical framework for the definition,
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design, specification, and integration of system
architectures is needed to allow for their productive
implementation.
This thesis has sought to present a basic introduction
to the theory of system architecture. Additionally, it has
used a current system to illustrate the concepts. Further,
it has hopefully identified the importance of system
architecture theory to future designs and towards the
enhancement of existing designs.
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